The market for real estate brokerage services in low- and high-income neighborhoods: A 6 city study by Yelowitz, Aaron et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The market for real estate brokerage
services in low- and high-income
neighborhoods: A 6 city study
Aaron Yelowitz and Frank Scott and Jason Beck
University of Kentucky
4 September 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41052/
MPRA Paper No. 41052, posted 5 September 2012 14:03 UTC
 
 
 
 
 
The Market for Real Estate Brokerage Services in Low- and High-Income 
Neighborhoods: A 6 City Study 
 
 
Aaron Yelowitz 
Department of Economics 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington, KY 40506 
 
Frank Scott 
Department of Economics 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington, KY 40506 
 
Jason Beck 
Department of Economics 
Armstrong Atlantic State University 
Savannah, GA 31419 
 
 
 
September, 2012 
 
Abstract: We examine the market structure for real estate brokerage services across six large 
metropolitan areas, to see whether low-income neighborhoods or neighborhoods where house 
prices are low are as well served by real estate professionals as higher income or higher price 
neighborhoods. We collect more than 300,000 real estate listings and compute the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for each zip code neighborhood in each MSA. When we divide 
neighborhoods based on income, house value, and race, we find no evidence that access is 
worse in disadvantaged areas; that is, the market structure for brokerage services is at least as 
competitive in less advantaged neighborhoods. We also analyze market leaders in the six cities 
and find that some firms specialize in particular market segments, however. 
Keywords: HHI, real estate brokerage competition, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, redlining 
The data and programs used in this study can be obtained from the authors. Contact Aaron Yelowitz at 
aaron@uky.edu for this information. 
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The Market for Real Estate Brokerage Services in Low- and High-Income 
Neighborhoods: A 6 City Study 
 
Introduction 
Residents of low-income or minority neighborhoods pay higher prices and have fewer choices 
for a variety of products and services. Underserved sectors include supermarkets, banks, and large drug 
stores,1 credit cards,2 gasoline retailing,3 and insurance.4 Allegations of “retail redlining” have led to 
lawsuits against companies such as General Motors, Wal-Mart, and Burger King.5 While differences in 
the performance of housing markets in low-income or minority neighborhoods have been extensively 
studied, most of the attention has been focused on possible redlining practices by mortgage lenders.6 
Little attention has been paid to real estate middlemen—brokers and agents—in assessing the 
performance of urban real estate markets.7 
 This is surprising, given that housing market outcomes vary greatly. Home ownership rates differ 
among various economic and demographic groups. Two dimensions that have probably attracted the 
most attention are income and race. Very low-income households have home ownership rates that are 
                                                          
1 Alwitt and Donley (1997) use Chicago as a case study and find that poorer zip codes have fewer and smaller 
outlets than nonpoor zip codes for supermarkets, banks, and large drug stores. 
2 Cohen-Cole (2011) finds that, after controlling for place-specific factors, qualitatively large differences exist in the 
amount of credit offered to similarly qualified applicants living in black vs. white areas. 
3 Myers, Close, Fox, Meyer, and Niemi (2011) analyze gasoline retailing and find that prices are higher in poorer 
areas, partially because of low competition and inelastic demand. 
4 Ong and Stoll (2007) find that variations in auto insurance costs occur because of both risk and redlining factors, 
and that black and poor neighborhoods are adversely affected. Regan (2007) focuses on insurance availability and 
finds positive correlation between the proportion of minority homeowners in a state and the share of more 
restrictive dwelling fire policies. 
5 See Myers, Close, Fox, Meyer, and Niemi (2011) for an extensive discussion of retail redlining.  
6 In the context of the Fair Housing Act, redlining is “the practice of denying a creditworthy applicant a loan for 
housing in a certain neighborhood even though the applicant may otherwise be eligible for the loan.” Redlining 
based on racial composition is illegal, while redlining based on economic factors is legal. See 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/fair_lend_fhact.pdf . 
7 Myers (2004) studies racial housing price differentials and controls for neighborhood effects. She suggests that 
one possible source of racial housing price differentials is supplier price discrimination by real estate brokers and 
agents. 
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37 percentage points lower than the rate for high-income households, while home ownership rates for 
minority households lag behind those of white households by 24 percentage points.8 There is some 
evidence that house prices paid also differ across groups. In a study of four cities, Bayer, Casey, Ferreira, 
and McMillan (2012) found that black and Hispanic homebuyers paid a premium of three percent—a 
difference not explained by variation in buyer income, wealth, or access to credit. 
The type and degree of services demanded by buyers and sellers differ for low vs. high-priced 
houses. Real estate markets tend to be thicker in lower price ranges. Product heterogeneity tends to be 
greater in higher price ranges. There is also broad agreement that real estate markets are local and not 
national in geographic scope. Real estate brokers and agents thus compete in local markets. In large 
metropolitan areas most agents and many brokers tend to specialize even more, and compete in sub-
markets/neighborhoods within the larger metropolitan market area. This outcome is not surprising, 
since sellers and buyers value the localized knowledge that agents and brokers bring to the transaction. 
Given all these aspects of housing markets, the question that naturally arises is whether 
residents of low-income neighborhoods are as well-served by real estate agents and brokers as 
residents of high-income neighborhoods. Especially in light of Hsieh and Moretti’s (2003) finding that 
when the average price of land in a city increases the fraction of real estate brokers relative to 
population increases and the productivity of a typical real estate agent falls, one can imagine that even 
in areas that are geographically proximate, different neighborhoods have different clienteles and are 
ripe for specialization, which may result in poorer neighborhoods being differentially served by real 
estate brokers and agents. 
 For this reason, we investigate whether sub-markets within broader metropolitan markets face 
different levels of competitiveness among real estate brokers. This research builds upon our earlier work 
                                                          
8 Bunce and Reeder (2007, p. 1). 
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that analyzes market concentration in small, medium, and large real estate markets.9 We have gathered 
data for six large metropolitan statistical areas: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, and 
Washington, D.C. These cities were chosen for their geographic diversity, income diversity, and very 
different average house prices. Demographic information on income, house values, population, racial 
composition, and home ownership were obtained at the zip code level from the 2000 Census. These 
data were merged with information we gathered in 2011 from the National Association of Realtors’ 
Realtor.com website on listings by broker for each zip code neighborhood. 
 Our final sample consists of 1,321 zip codes in these six cities which can be merged with Census 
Factfinder data and where there were at least 50 MLS listings. We compute Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Indices for each MSA and then for each zip code within the six MSA’s. 10 After presenting zip-code-level 
summary statistics for each MSA, we analyze HHI’s at the zip code level. We regress zip-code-level HHI 
on racial composition, median house price, median household income, and a measure of the 
heterogeneity of the housing stock in the neighborhood. We find that sub-markets are less concentrated 
in neighborhoods with heterogeneity in the housing stock and greater percent nonwhite, but more 
concentrated in neighborhoods with higher average prices. To see whether real estate brokers tend to 
specialize by neighborhood, we also identify the real estate brokers with the largest market shares in 
low-income, low-house-price, and high-minority neighborhoods and compare with high-income, high-
house-price, and low-minority neighborhoods. We find that in many cases the market leaders differ 
substantially by neighborhood. 
 
Income and Racial Gaps in Home Ownership 
                                                          
9 Beck, Scott, and Yelowitz (2012). 
10 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated by summing the squared market shares (expressed as a 
percentage) of all firms on the supply side of a market. A monopoly market thus has an HHI of 10,000, while a 
market of atomistic firms has an HHI that approaches zero. 
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Considerable effort has gone into understanding the determinants of home ownership rates by 
income, racial, and ethnic status.11 Haurin, Herbert, and Rosenthal (2007) assessed the extent of 
differences in home ownership rates among different socioeconomic groups, and reviewed existing 
research on possible explanations for these differences. They first discussed factors that affect the 
formation of households, and then turned to the propensity for homeownership. 
 In addition to factors that influence household demand for home ownership, Haurin, Herbert, 
and Rosenthal evaluated three types of supply constraints that may restrict different households’ access 
to single-family housing: (1) the supply of mortgage credit may affect low-income and minority 
households differently; (2) there may be racial discrimination in mortgage markets; and (3) the type of 
housing stock may vary across different neighborhoods. 
Racial or ethnic discrimination that affects access to homeownership can occur at several 
different levels. Munnell, Tootell, Browne, and NcEneaney (1996) supplemented data generated as a 
result of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act with data collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
from lending institutions on financial, employment, and property characteristics to see whether race 
plays a role in the lending decision. They found significant disparities between minority and white 
rejection rates, even after controlling for other factors. Yinger (1991) used data from the 1989 HUD 
Housing Discrimination Study that conducted fair housing audits. He found statistically significant 
differences in the treatment of blacks and whites and in the treatment of Hispanics and Anglos by sales 
and rental agents. Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) used a similar approach to investigate the 
treatment of whites, blacks, and Hispanics by real estate brokers. They too found evidence of 
discrimination. 
These and many other studies have examined person-based discrimination. A related issue is 
whether different types of neighborhoods are treated differently by various parties involved in the 
                                                          
11 Cityscape recently devoted two special issues that focused on recent research on low-income and minority 
homeownership (Bunce and Reeder, 2007 and Reeder, 2008). 
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supply of housing. Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel, and Hannan (1994) used individual loan records from HUD 
along with census tract data to study default risk characteristics and performance of FHA-insured 
mortgages. They found that loans in high-income and high-house-price census tracts are less likely to 
default. They found no strong relationship between racial characteristics of a neighborhood and 
likelihood of default. Tootell (1996) addressed the issue of redlining directly by studying the racial 
composition of the neighborhood while controlling for the race of the applicant. He found that the racial 
composition of the neighborhood where a property is located is not significantly related to the lending 
decision. More recently, Ghent, Hernández-Murillo, and Owyang (2012) examine subprime loan pricing 
during 2005, and find evidence of redlining and adverse pricing for blacks and Hispanics. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Yet to be analyzed is whether the supply of real estate professionals and market structure of 
real estate brokerage differs by neighborhood characteristics.12 In a non-discriminatory competitive 
market characterized by free entry, we would expect real estate middlemen to pursue profitable 
opportunities wherever they occur. In equilibrium, agents and brokers would list and sell properties and 
be compensated for their services at prices that yielded the same return in low-income neighborhoods 
as high-income neighborhoods, and in zip codes where house prices are low as in zip codes where prices 
are high. Only the profit opportunities, and not the racial and ethnic characteristics of a neighborhood, 
would affect agents’ and brokers’ supply decisions. 
                                                          
12 In one part of the study by Ondrich, Ross and Yinger (2003), the authors used paired-audit-study data (the 
Housing Discrimination Study) to examine whether real estate agents representing home buyers practice redlining, 
defined as withholding from all customers houses located in integrated neighborhoods. They found evidence to 
support this hypothesis in suburbs, but not central cities. Galster and Godfrey (2005) also used these data to 
provide evidence of racial steering of home buyers. Zhao, Ondrich and Yinger (2006) found that the scope of 
discrimination and the probability that it will be encountered by a buyer diminished sharply between 1989 and 
2000. It is important to note that performing a paired audit study – which inherently involves deception on the 
part of the auditors – is far easier and more feasible with home buyers rather than home sellers. 
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Geographically proximate neighborhoods can differ markedly in per capita income and ethnic 
and racial composition. Average home prices can also differ significantly by neighborhood. The 
prevailing method of compensating real estate agents and brokers involved in a housing transaction is 
that the seller pays a fixed percentage commission on the selling price of the home. This structure limits 
how real estate agents and brokers are compensated for their services. Payment for services rendered 
may be more closely connected to the selling price of the product than to the costs incurred in 
facilitating the transaction. 
 On both the buying and selling side of a real estate transaction, there are fixed and variable 
components of cost.13 It is also the case that to a large degree costs are endogenous, i.e. agents and 
brokers themselves determine the level of effort and expense involved in listing and selling a particular 
house. The nature of costs combined with the fixed percentage commission structure means that the 
profitability of any transaction is likely to increase with the selling price of the house.14 It is entirely 
plausible that real estate brokers and agents may be less likely to enter and serve neighborhoods where 
home prices are relatively low. 
Given the relatively low home ownership rates among low-income and minority households, a 
natural question to ask is whether neighborhoods with higher proportions of low-income or minority 
households, where home prices may be relatively lower, are underserved by real estate middlemen. If 
brokers avoid neighborhoods, then a lack of competition among agents and brokers may lead to higher 
commissions and reduced services for residents of such neighborhoods.15 Competitiveness in real estate 
brokerage has been a concern of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal 
                                                          
13 See the discussion in White (2006, pp. 7-8). 
14 Hsieh and Moretti (2003) analyze the market for real estate in different cities, and find that the supply of real 
estate agents is highly responsive to the average price of housing, which they attribute in no small part to the fixed 
commission rate structure. Although this conventional wisdom about commission rates may be correct, there is 
very little direct evidence on full commission rates. One notable exception is Woodward (2008). 
15 One limitation of our study is that we are unable to determine whether the market segmentation we observe is 
the result of deliberate choices by individual large brokerages not to serve certain neighborhoods, which is the 
essence of redlining. Rather, we are able to examine availability of brokerage services at the market level. 
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Trade Commission for a long time. The two agencies issued a joint report on competitiveness in the real 
estate industry in 2007. They cited anecdotal evidence of high concentration levels in local real estate 
markets as cause for concern.16  
The general concern about competition in real estate brokerage alongside the differential rates 
of home ownership by income and race suggest an analysis of concentration levels by neighborhood. 
The structural question that we analyze is whether low-income, low-price, or high-minority 
neighborhoods face access issues by real estate brokers, i.e. do brokers avoid low-income and low-
house-price neighborhoods because it is less profitable to do business there? If so, the lack of 
competition may lead to less market activity and relatively higher prices for real estate services. 
Similarly, do brokers as an industry discriminate against and avoid minority-dominated neighborhoods, 
possibly leading to lower levels of service and higher commissions for real estate services? 
To answer these questions we chose six large MSA’s, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Los 
Angeles, and Washington, D.C. We gathered data that allow us to analyze the number and market 
shares of real estate brokers serving each zip-code neighborhood. We combined these data with Census 
data on income, house values, and racial composition, so that we can determine whether the supply of 
real estate brokerage services differs by income, house price, or racial composition in a neighborhood. 
 
Data 
We collected data from www.Realtor.com in April, 2011 for all zip codes in the Atlanta, Boston, 
Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, and Washington D.C. metropolitan statistical areas. This web site is 
                                                          
16 Motivated by that and other studies that analyzed one or a handful of markets, we collected data in 2007 and 
2009 on the number of brokers and market shares for 90 small, medium, and large real estate markets around the 
country and computed HHI’s. In medium and large-sized markets we found no evidence of market concentration 
levels that might create problems for competition. In some of the small markets in our sample, we found HHI’s in 
the range that would invite antitrust scrutiny under the FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines if two larger firms 
proposed to merge. We were also able to analyze the size distribution of firms in sub-markets within a larger 
metropolitan area, Louisville, KY, but were unable to look at sub-markets stratified by income, house prices, or 
racial composition. 
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maintained by the National Association of Realtors and allows users to search real estate listings 
throughout the country by city or zip code. It provides a nationally consistent source of data on local real 
estate markets. According to a report prepared by the GAO (2005, p. 18), approximately 95 percent of 
all homes listed on MLS’s around the country are contained on www.Realtor.com. Since the brokerage 
firm listing the house is reported, we are able to record all the listings in each city at a point in time and 
thereby analyze local market structure. In Appendix I, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
extent to which the NAR data appear to summarize the full housing market, since other options like For 
Sale By Owner (FSBO) or listing exclusively on the local MLS (but not www.Realtor.com) are ignored in 
the subsequent analysis. The short answer is that the NAR data appear to summarize the vast majority 
of market activity, and this is the case not only for each of the six cities but for individual neighborhoods 
as well.17  
We gathered information on all single-family homes, townhomes, and condominiums within 
each zip code, including the dwelling’s address, city, lot size, bedrooms, bathrooms, listing broker, and 
unique URL link. Using a web scraping program, we attempted to collect information from 2,984 zip 
codes within these six MSA’s; within those zip codes our program collected over 300,000 listings. Some 
zip codes did not contain any listings, most often because they were P.O. Boxes or unique zip codes (for 
example, related to a government facility). Overall, 1,884 zip codes had at least one real estate listing. 
The amount of real estate activity in each MSA differed substantially. For example, Atlanta had 265 real 
estate listings per zip code, more than three times higher than Boston’s average of 85.18 
We compiled a list of firms in each market from the core data set of 314,232 real estate listings. 
This was a non-trivial task, because real estate listings by the same office often have slightly different 
                                                          
17 In related research we have taken steps to verify the validity of the Realtor.com data against other sources (see 
Beck, Scott, and Yelowitz, 2012). We compared Realtor.com data to MLS data used by the FTC/USDOJ in their 2007 
Report and also found a very close connection. For example, our analysis found Des Moines, IA as a highly 
concentrated medium-sized market in 2007, consistent with discussion in the FTC/USDOJ report.  It should be 
noted that we do not observe transactions, only listings. 
18 See Appendix Exhibit 1 for a complete description and breakdown of the construction of our sample. 
 
 
10 
 
names. Consider, for example, Keller Williams franchisees in Atlanta. According to the Keller Williams 
website, there are 32 offices in the Atlanta area.19 One of the larger franchisee offices is “Keller Williams 
Realty Atlanta Partners”. Various listings in Atlanta substitute the word “Ptnrs” or “Part” or “Part.” or 
“Ptnr” for the word “Partners”. Other listings substitute the word “Atl” or “Atl.” for the word “Atlanta”. 
Some other listings substitute “Rlty” or “Re” for the word “Realty”. And a few listings use the 
abbreviations “KW” or “Keller Wms” for “Keller Williams”. Overall, across the six MSA’s, there were 
18,825 unique names for offices or firms, although clearly from this example, a particular real estate 
brokerage firm can have multiple unique names in the data. 
To create the HHI for each MSA and for each zip code, we had to perform the particularly time-
intensive task of editing the firm names in defensible ways. Our first approach was to make extremely 
minor changes to office names, and then to treat each office as a unique firm. These minor changes 
included changing all lower case letters to upper case, removing extra spaces, dashes, periods, commas, 
slashes, explanation points, and converting obvious abbreviations (e.g. “C 21” to “CENTURY 21”). After 
these minor changes were made, there were a total of 16,264 firms across the six MSA’s, varying from 
1,767 in Boston to 5,855 in Los Angeles. To the extent that some of the individual offices identified by 
this process are parts of larger multi-location brokerage firms, then this “minor change” approach 
understates the HHI in the locality. Our second approach was to make “major edits”, the most important 
of which is grouping all listings with a given franchise name and treating them as part of the same firm. 
For example, this approach would group the 32 Keller Williams offices in Atlanta into one firm.20 As a 
consequence, this method likely overstates market concentration. The “major edit” approach leads to 
14,922 firms across all areas, varying from 1,618 in Boston to 5,296 in Los Angeles. In this way, we are 
able to provide lower and upper bounds on the size distribution of firms in each given market. 
                                                          
19 http://www.kw.com/kw/OfficeSearchSubmit.action?startRow=1&rows=50&city=Atlanta&stateProvId=GA&zip=  
20 As is indicated in their Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars, most real estate franchisors structure their franchise 
contracts so as to give legal autonomy to each franchisee, which would suggest that our first approach gives a 
better measure of the number of independent producers in a market than our second approach. 
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From the initial 1,884 zip codes with real estate listings in the MSAs, we created various 
geographies besides the MSA. In one specification, we restrict zip codes to those that are officially in the 
central city according to the U.S. Postal Service.21 These political jurisdictions yield many fewer zip 
codes, as illustrated in Appendix Exhibit 1. In another specification, we rely on agent-reported city 
names, even if the city name is inconsistent with the official name in the zip code. This again yields many 
fewer zip codes. 
The MSA sample of zip codes forms the starting point for much of our analysis on disparities in 
market structure by income, house value, or race. From the initial sample of 1,884 zip codes, we restrict 
the sample to the 1,361 zip codes with at least 50 or more real estate listings. By doing so, we believe 
that our computation of HHI will not be mechanically influenced by small sample sizes (for example, the 
HHI must be 10,000 if there is only one listing in a zip code, and cannot be lower than 5,000 if there are 
two listings). We then append data from “Census Factfinder,” drawing on the 2000 Census.22 Overall, 
approximately 97 percent of zip codes – or 1,321 of 1,361 – had information tabulated from the 
decennial Census. We chose three critical characteristics at the zip code level – median value of single-
family owner-occupied homes, median family income, and percent white – from the Factfinder tool. 
 
Empirical Results 
  Our goal in this paper is to divide large markets (MSA’s) into neighborhoods (zip codes) where 
we can obtain demographic information on income, house values, population, and home ownership for 
2000, merged with concentration levels from 2011, and use these data to investigate whether the 
market structure for real estate brokerage services is fundamentally different in low-income, low-house-
price, or high-minority neighborhoods. Exhibit 1 contains HHI’s computed for each of the six cities at the 
                                                          
21 See http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/citytown.jsp, where the central cities are Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Los 
Angeles and Washington. 
22 See http://factfinder2.census.gov/. The zip-code data is derived from the Census Summary Tape Files. 
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MSA level, the city level where the listing real estate agent inputs the city, and at the city level as 
defined by the USPS zip code. We include HHI’s where all offices are considered separately, and where 
all offices of each franchisor are treated as part of one firm. At the MSA level, HHI’s range from 36 to 
341 when all offices are considered separately and from 302 to 678 when all offices of a franchisor are 
combined. HHI’s are slightly higher when calculated at the city level, but not appreciably. All are clearly 
in the range considered unconcentrated by the USDOJ and the FTC when evaluating horizontal 
mergers.23 
 This point is reinforced when we examine market shares of the top four brokerages in each 
MSA. Exhibit 2a contains this information when all offices are considered separately, and Exhibit 2b does 
the same when all offices of a franchisor are combined. At the MSA level, even the largest real estate 
broker has less than a five-percent market share in Atlanta, Boston, Dallas, and Los Angeles when each 
office is considered as an independent firm. In Chicago, the largest broker has 7.8 percent of the market, 
and in Washington, D.C. the largest broker has 16.2 percent market share. When we treat all offices of a 
franchisor as one firm, a slightly different picture emerges. The larger franchisors in each MSA now have 
market shares in the teens, although none have as much as twenty percent of the market for real estate 
listings in the entire MSA. 
  These results confirm our earlier research that indicated a lack of concentration in markets for 
real estate brokerage in larger urban areas.24 Now we turn our attention to smaller sub-markets within 
the larger MSA’s. Exhibit 3 contains summary statistics at the zip code level for each of the six MSA’s in 
our sample. Average population per zip code area varies from 20,300 in Boston to 38,009 in Los Angeles. 
Boston had the fewest housing units per zip code, 8,097, and Los Angeles had the most, 13,024. Median 
income ranged from $58,400 in Atlanta to $77,200 in Washington, D.C. Considerable variation exists 
                                                          
23 Markets are classified according to HHI into three types under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: 
unconcentrated (HHI<1500), moderately concentrated (1500<HHI<2500), and highly concentrated (HHI>2500). See 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html  
24 Beck, Scott, and Yelowitz (2012), Tables 2a and 2b. 
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across cities in median house value, with housing being the cheapest in Dallas (median = $124,900) and 
most expensive in Los Angeles (median = $286,700). The percent of the population classified as white 
varies from 58.1 percent in Los Angeles to 87.1 percent in Boston. Finally, the level of housing market 
activity varies considerably as well. In Boston there were only 113 MLS listings per zip code, which is less 
than one-third the level in Atlanta where there were 380 MLS listings per zip code. 
 Exhibit 3 also contains HHI’s computed at the zip code level and averaged over the entire urban 
area for each of the six MSA’s. Again we compute HHI’s when all franchise offices are considered 
separately and when all offices of a franchisor are combined. Considering all franchise offices separately 
yields average HHI’s that range from 355 in Los Angeles to 815 in Washington, D.C. Combining all offices 
of each franchisor and treating them as one firm yields average HHI’s that range from 642 in Los Angeles 
to 1151 in Chicago. None of the six MSA’s on average has market structures at the zip code level that 
even fall into the moderately concentrated level according to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
These average HHI’s also fall in the middle of the range of HHI’s that we observed when we analyzed 
small markets (fewer than 1000 listings) in our 2012 study.25 
 We are now ready to address the main topic of this paper—are low-income, low-house-price, or 
high-minority neighborhoods differentially served by the real estate brokerage industry? We have 
ranked zip codes in each of the six MSA’s by median income quartile, by median house value, and by 
percent of the population classified as white. Exhibit 4 contains the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile cutoffs 
for median income, median house value, and fraction white in each of the six MSA’s. Unsurprisingly, 
there is considerable variation across cities. For example, for the 172 zip codes in Atlanta, a quarter have 
fewer than 57.5 percent of the population white, and moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of zip 
code neighborhoods results in a 30 percentage point increase in fraction white. A similar change in 
Boston results in a much smaller (13 percentage points) change. Moving from the 25th to the 75th 
                                                          
25 Beck, Scott, and Yelowitz (2012), Table 2c. 
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percentile in median house value in Atlanta results in a $58k change in price, while a similar movement 
in Los Angeles results in a $168k change in price. 
 Now we examine the relationship between market concentration as measured by the HHI for 
real estate brokers and median income, median house price, and fraction white more rigorously. We 
regress HHI in each zip code neighborhood on quartile categorical variables and a city identifier. Atlanta 
is the excluded MSA. These results are contained in columns A, B, and C of Exhibit 5. As can be seen, 
market concentration increases with median income, median house price, and fraction white, and there 
are significant differences in concentration across MSA’s. 
 Median income, median house price, and fraction white are obviously correlated, so we next 
regress zip code level HHI on all three along with a city identifier. These results are contained in column 
D of Exhibit 5. House price and fraction white have significant effects on the degree of market 
concentration in local real estate brokerage markets. Zip codes in the highest quartile of house prices 
are significantly more concentrated than zip codes in the lower three quartiles. Zip codes in the lowest 
quartile of fraction white are significantly less concentrated than zip codes in the higher three quartiles. 
Residents of neighborhoods with relatively lower house prices and with relatively more minorities face 
markets for real estate brokerage services that are less, not more, concentrated. They are served by 
more firms with smaller market shares. 
 To further enrich our analysis of the market structure of real estate brokerage, we consider the 
effect of local market heterogeneity on the size distribution of firms. If the housing stock in a 
neighborhood is relatively homogeneous, then brokerage firms may be able to take advantage of scale 
economies, leading to fewer and larger firms. If the housing stock in a neighborhood is heterogeneous, 
then brokerage firms may specialize and occupy one of the many niches in market space, leading to 
more and smaller firms. HHI is thus expected to be smaller the more heterogeneous the housing stock in 
a neighborhood. 
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 To measure heterogeneity in the housing stock in a zip-code neighborhood we calculate the 
standard deviation of list prices of houses advertised for sale on Realtor.com. Greater variation in list 
prices suggests greater variation in square footage, lot sizes, quality of construction, and various other 
characteristics and amenities associated with each house in the neighborhood. We include the standard 
deviation of list price in our HHI regression model, and these results are contained in column E. We also 
include mean list price in the regression. 
 Greater heterogeneity in the housing stock, as measured by the standard deviation of list prices, 
is associated with less concentration on the supply side of real estate brokerage markets. In 
neighborhoods where there is greater variety among houses, there tend to be more brokers with 
smaller market shares than in neighborhoods where the housing stock is more homogeneous. This 
relationship is statistically significant and robust to different specifications of the measure of 
heterogeneity.26 Another interesting result of this regression is that the fraction white is still statistically 
significant. The estimated HHI is considerably smaller in the lowest quartile of fraction-white 
neighborhoods than in the three upper quartiles. High-minority neighborhoods are apparently served by 
more brokers with smaller market shares than relatively whiter neighborhoods, which perhaps suggests 
some specialization of real estate brokers by race. 
 To further explore the supply of brokerage services in different neighborhoods, we identify the 
market leaders and their market shares in the bottom and top quartiles of income, house price, and 
fraction white in each of the six MSA’s. These results are contained in Exhibit 6, which lists the market 
shares of the top eight brokers in the lowest and highest income, house-price, and fraction-white 
quartiles. 
                                                          
26 Column F regresses HHI on the ratio of the 90th percentile list price to the 10th percentile list price in the zip code, 
along with median list price and the full set of other variables. As can be seen, the results are relatively unchanged 
from Column E. 
 
 
16 
 
 Market leaders in the bottom and top quartiles of income, house price, and fraction white are 
generally the same brokers. Some differences, however, do appear. For example, in Atlanta, Harry 
Norman Realtors was the third largest broker with a 10.0 percent market share in the top quartile of zip 
codes ranked by house price, but was the seventh largest broker in the lowest house-price quartile with 
only a 1.9 percent market share. Metro Brokers was a market leader in the lowest quartile of zip codes 
ranked by house price with a market share of 5.7 percent, but they do not appear among the top eight 
brokers in the highest house-price quartile. 
 Several of the larger brokers in Boston appear to specialize in sub-markets. Coldwell Banker has 
a 25.2 percent market share in the highest house-price quartile, but only a 6.9 percent market share in 
the lowest house-price quartile. When zip codes are ranked by fraction white, Coldwell Banker has a 
15.5 percent market share in the bottom quartile and a 7.4 percent market share in the top quartile. 
While Coldwell Banker seems to specialize in high-income, high-house-price, racially mixed 
neighborhoods in Boston, RE/MAX International seems to take the opposite approach. RE/MAX is the 
market leader in the lowest income and house-price quartile zip codes and in the highest fraction-white 
zip codes. Hammond Residential Real Estate pursues a similar strategy. They are among the top eight in 
the highest income and house-price and lowest fraction-white quartiles, but do not appear among the 
top eight in the lowest income and house-price and highest fraction-white quartiles.27 
 In Chicago market leader RE/MAX is relatively more specialized in high-income and high-
fraction-white zip codes relative to low-income and low-fraction-white zip codes. RE/MAX has roughly 
the same market share, however, in zip codes ranked according to house price. Second-ranked Coldwell 
Banker also is relatively more specialized in high-income and high-fraction-white zip codes, but is even 
more specialized in high-house-price zip codes relative to low-house-price zip codes. Several 
independent brokers have significant market shares in particular market niches. @Properties is the 
                                                          
27 Boston is the only one of the six MSA’s where median house price and fraction white are negatively correlated. 
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fourth largest broker in low-income zip codes and the third largest broker in low-fraction-white 
neighborhoods. Baird and Warner is the third largest broker in zip codes ranked by income and by house 
price. 
 An interesting pattern emerges from closer scrutiny of individual broker market shares in Dallas. 
Market leader Keller-Williams and Ebby Halliday Realtors both specialize (relatively) in high-income and 
high-house-price neighborhoods. Century 21 ranks first and second in low-house-price and low-income 
neighborhoods, but is much lower ranked in high-house-price and high-income neighborhoods. When 
neighborhoods are ranked by fraction white, however, no specialization patterns are evident. 
 Los Angeles is characterized by the highest correlation between fraction white and house price 
and income among the six MSA’s. Century 21 has the largest market share in low-income, low-house-
price, and low-fraction-white zip codes, but is sixth, seventh, and sixth, respectively, in high-income, 
high-house-price, and high-fraction-white zip codes. Coldwell Banker exhibits the reverse of that 
pattern, with the leading market share in high-income, high-house-price, and high-fraction-white zip 
codes. RE/MAX is the third-ranked broker city-wide by overall market share. Its market presence, 
however, is evenly spread across zip codes as ranked by income, house price, and fraction white. 
 In Washington, D.C. the two overall market leaders are Long & Foster and RE/MAX. Long & 
Foster seems to specialize in high-income and high-house-price zip codes, while RE/MAX shows no such 
tendency. Weichert Real Estate Associates is fourth-ranked overall in the D.C. market. It has roughly 
double the market representation in high-income, high-house-price, and high-fraction-white zip codes 
as in low-income, low-house-price, and low-fraction-white zip codes. Third-ranked Keller-Williams is 
spread evenly over the MSA when zip codes are sorted by income, house price, and fraction white. 
 In summary, the analysis of Exhibit 6 certainly suggests that firms specialize in different parts of 
the housing market; nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest that this specialization leads to 
differential availability of brokerage services.  It may be that the services offered by brokers serving low-
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income, low-house-price, or low-fraction-white neighborhoods falls short of those offered by brokers in 
other neighborhoods, but such differences would arise naturally if different clients demand different 
types and levels of services. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Real estate brokers often specialize in local sub-markets within larger urban markets, especially 
since geographically proximate neighborhoods can differ nontrivially by income levels, house prices, 
racial composition, and other attributes. Real estate agents and brokers are typically compensated 
based upon the selling price of the home. The nature of agents’ and brokers’ costs is such that the 
profitability of any real estate transaction is likely to increase with the selling price of the house. 
 The question naturally arises whether low-income neighborhoods or neighborhoods where 
house prices are low are as well served by real estate professionals as higher income or higher price 
neighborhoods. If so, this might partially explain the income gap in home ownership. A related question 
is whether neighborhoods with high-minority populations are differentially served by brokers, which 
might partially explain the racial gap in home ownership. Poor service by real estate professionals might 
also affect property appreciation in minority neighborhoods, which in turn could have important 
implications for the wealth gap by race.28 
 To answer these questions we gather data for six large metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Boston, 
Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. We collected information on income, house values, 
racial composition, and home ownership at the zip code level from the 2000 Census. We combined 
these data with information that we collected from Realtor.com in 2011 on real estate listings by broker 
                                                          
28 Herbert and Belsky (2008, p. 30-31) argue that the literature on differential housing appreciation rates is thin 
and it is difficult to draw general conclusions. One study – Kim (2000) – did find lower appreciation rates for 
minorities in Milwaukee, WI, neighborhoods. 
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for each zip-code neighborhood, which we used to calculate HHI’s and market shares for individual real 
estate brokers. 
 To understand the relationship between market concentration and income, house price, and 
fraction white, we regress HHI on median income, median house price, and fraction white in each zip 
code neighborhood. We also include in the regression analysis a measure of the heterogeneity in the 
housing stock in each zip code, the standard deviation in list prices, as well as mean list price. We find 
that in neighborhoods where there is greater variety among houses, there tend to be more brokers with 
smaller market shares than in neighborhoods where the housing stock is more homogeneous. Estimated 
HHI is considerably smaller in the lowest quartile of fraction-white neighborhoods than in the upper 
three quartiles. High-minority neighborhoods are apparently served by more brokers with smaller 
market shares than relatively whiter neighborhoods. Market concentration also increases with average 
list price, indicating that high-house-price neighborhoods tend to be served by fewer but larger real 
estate brokers. 
 Finally, we analyzed market shares of individual brokers in each MSA in the lowest and highest 
quartiles of zip code neighborhoods ranked by median income, median house price, and fraction white. 
The general pattern is that market leaders in one segment tend to be market leaders in other segments, 
however, there are numerous examples of brokers specializing in particular market segments. 
 It is important to note that our investigation of access to real estate brokerage across 
neighborhoods only scratches the surface of what is surely a more complicated picture. D’Rozario and 
Williams (2005) note that retail redlining can fall into eight categories, only one of which is refusing 
service to all customers in certain areas. We cannot observe the quality of brokerage services, and it is 
possible that smaller firms serving the minority/low-price/low-income neighborhoods provide lower 
quality service than some of the market leaders who do not have a presence there. We also do not 
analyze the commission rate structure across neighborhoods. Getting full commission rates (that is, of 
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both the listing and selling agent) is very difficult, because as Zumpano and Hooks (1988) point out, in 
1980 the NAR adopted policies to prohibit publishing the total commission on MLS listings. Although 
Hsieh and Moretti (2003) present full commission rates for a number of cities, the commissions were 
drawn from the late 1970s, before the NAR policy was in effect. With the notable exception of 
Woodward (2008), no recent study has presented the distribution of full commission rates. Given the 
difficulties in measuring quality and commission rates, our data scraping method which allows us to 
learn about access to real estate brokerage is an appropriate first step. Future studies that measure 
either of these two dimensions will enhance the understanding of redlining in real estate brokerage. 
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Exhibit 1 
HHI's by different geographic levels and brokerage definitions 
 
Atlanta Boston Chicago Dallas 
Los 
Angeles 
Washington 
DC 
MSA Level 
      HHI - All Offices Considered 
Separate 120 36 122 107 52 341 
HHI - All Franchise Offices 
Combined 512 418 677 622 302 678 
Sample Size 67,426 19,783 85,825 34,782 52,037 32,986 
       City Level (Realtor Defined) 
      HHI - All Offices Considered 
Separate 233 142 249 184 46 562 
HHI - All Franchise Offices 
Combined 633 393 414 460 340 773 
Sample Size 13,441 2,269 18,531 6,494 5,363 2,878 
       City Level (USPS Zip Codes) 
      HHI - All Offices Considered 
Separate 224 144 228 259 46 560 
HHI - All Franchise Offices 
Combined 620 396 408 498 366 772 
Sample Size 15,142 2,255 19,850 6,113 6,126 2,881 
Notes: Sample size refers to the number of MLS listings used to compute the HHI. All data obtained from 
Realtor.com in April 2011. The zip codes used to define MSAs come from 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/metroareas/metroarea.html . MSAs include both the central 
city and other cities that are part of the same labor market. In the Atlanta MSA, the cities with the most 
listings were: Atlanta, Marietta, Lawrenceville, Decatur, Cumming, Alpharetta, Smyrna, Kennesaw, 
Douglasville, and Acworth. In the Boston MSA, the cities with the most listings were: Boston, Plymouth, 
Newton, Quincy, Cambridge, Brockton, Lowell, Rochester, Manchester, and Haverhill. In the Chicago 
MSA, the cities with the most listings were: Chicago, Aurora, Naperville, Elgin, Joliet, Plainfield, Palatine, 
Des Plaines, Evanston, and Arlington Heights. In the Dallas MSA, the cities with the most listings were: 
Dallas, Fort Worth, Arlington, Plano, Mckinney, Frisco, Garland, Irving, Carrollton, and Denton. In the Los 
Angeles MSA, the cities with the most listings were: Los Angeles, Long Beach, Lancaster, Irvine, 
Palmdale, Santa Ana, Anaheim, Huntington Beach, Whittier, and Orange. In the Washington DC MSA, 
the leading cities were: Washington, Alexandria, Silver Spring, Woodbridge, Fredericksburg, Arlington, 
Frederick, Hyattsville, Upper Marlboro and Bowie. The city-level definitions include only listings in the 
city proper, not adjoining areas. 
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Exhibit 2a 
Top Four Brokerages by MSA: HHI - All Offices Considered Separate 
Atlanta Boston Chicago 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Harry Norman Realtors 4.5% Keller Williams Realty 2.5% 
Coldwell Banker 
Residential 7.8% 
Prudential Georgia 
Realty 4.3% Re/Max Prestige 1.8% Baird & Warner 3.7% 
Better Homes & Gardens 
Real Estate Metro 
Brokers 4.1% 
William Raveis Real 
Estate & Home Services  1.7% @Properties  2.6% 
Coldwell Banker 
Residential Br 4.1% 
Century 21 
Commonwealth  1.2% 
Koenig & Strey 
Real Living 2.5% 
Dallas Los Angeles Washington DC 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Keller Williams Realty 4.9% 
Prudential California 
Realty  4.8% 
Long & Foster Real 
Estate Inc 16.2% 
Ebby Halliday Realtors 4.7% First Team Real Estate 3.0% Weichert Realtors 4.5% 
Coldwell Banker 
Residential  3.5% Keller Williams Realty 1.8% 
Coldwell Banker 
Residential 
Brokerage 3.1% 
Coldwell Banker APEX  2.4% Coldwell Banker 1.7% 
Keller Williams 
Realty 3.1% 
Notes: Sample sizes are the same as for the MSA sample in Exhibit 1. 
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Exhibit 2b 
Top Four Brokerages by MSA - HHI - All Franchise Offices Combined 
Atlanta Boston Chicago 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Keller-Williams 15.0% Coldwell Banker 12.7% Re/Max 18.8% 
Re/Max 11.8% Re/Max 10.9% Coldwell Banker 13.5% 
Coldwell Banker 7.0% Century 21 7.4% Century 21 8.0% 
Prudential 5.5% Keller-Williams 5.6% Prudential 4.8% 
Dallas Los Angeles Washington DC 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Keller-Williams 16.1% Coldwell Banker 8.4% Long & Foster 17.2% 
Re/Max 12.1% Century 21 7.6% Re/Max 15.9% 
Coldwell Banker 8.5% Re/Max 7.4% Keller-Williams 6.7% 
Ebby Halliday Realtors 8.0% Prudential 7.3% Weichert 4.6% 
Notes: Sample sizes are the same as for the MSA sample in Exhibit 1. 
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Exhibit 3 
Zip Code Level Summary Statistics 
 
All MSAs 
Atlanta 
MSA 
Boston 
MSA 
Chicago 
MSA 
Dallas 
MSA 
Los 
Angeles 
MSA 
Washingto
n DC MSA 
Population 28216 25369 20300 28959 25395 38009 23077 
 
(18429) (14334) (12472) (21962) (15018) (19525) (13478) 
Housing 
Units 10570 9853 8097 11023 10013 13024 9119 
 
(6496) (5398) (5113) (8316) (5996) (5613) (5456) 
Median 
Income 
(in $1000s) 65.9 58.4 71.4 67.6 60.7 61.4 77.2 
 
(25.6) (21.3) (24.3) (25.2) (22.8) (27.6) (25.3) 
Median 
House 
Value 
(in $1000s) 205.1 142.3 242.7 184.8 124.9 286.7 205.7 
 
(135.4) (77.1) (146.7) (114.1) (77.4) (170.3) (91.1) 
Percent 
White (%) 70.4 67.6 87.1 76.1 75.2 58.1 66.0 
 
(24.4) (26.3) (14.8) (25.3) (18.0) (21.8) (25.3) 
MLS 
Listings 207 380 113 258 175 160 154 
 
(156) (225) (66) (162) (111) (88) (86) 
HHI  
All 
Franchise 
Offices 
Considered 
Separate 597 473 794 668 593 355 815 
 
(417) (347) (443) (440) (352) (234) (465) 
HHI  
All 
Franchise 
Offices 
Combined 971 824 1138 1151 1062 642 1115 
 
(481) (360) (528) (477) (417) (312) (515) 
Sample 
Size 1321 172 157 310 176 308 198 
Notes: Zip codes restricted to those with 50+ MLS listings on Realtor.com and where the zip code could 
be merged to Census Factfinder data from 2000. MLS listings gathered between April 11-13, 2011. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. The HHI measures and listings are computed in 2011, while the 
population, housing, income, house value and race statistics are computed from the 2000 Census. 
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Exhibit 4 
Descriptive Statistics (Unit of observation is Zip Code) 
 
Atlanta 
MSA 
Boston 
MSA 
Chicago 
MSA 
Dallas 
MSA 
Los Angeles 
MSA 
Washington DC 
MSA 
25th Percentile 
of Median Family 
Income $45,394 $55,601 $53,631 $45,328 $41,175 $60,284 
50th Percentile 
of Median Family 
Income $54,829 $67,004 $64,631 $56,980 $55,994 $74,539 
75th Percentile 
of Median Family 
Income $69,463 $82,072 $76,594 $71,482 $75,940 $92,091 
25th Percentile 
of Median House 
Value $97,550 $162,400 $124,100 $77,600 $174,650 $143,200 
50th Percentile 
of Median House 
Value $117,050 $196,500 $162,250 $105,100 $233,900 $182,250 
75th Percentile 
of Median House 
Value $155,650 $262,400 $208,400 $152,650 $343,250 $234,300 
25th Percentile 
of Fraction White 57.5% 83.8% 67.3% 66.9% 42.0% 52.9% 
50th Percentile 
of Fraction White 76.5% 93.6% 86.2% 80.4% 59.6% 73.0% 
75th Percentile 
of Fraction White 87.1% 96.9% 93.8% 88.8% 76.8% 84.5% 
Mean List Price $226,666 $474,792 $275,020 $271,962 $663,908 $449,861 
Median List Price $169,779 $384,918 $221,578 $199,802 $506,807 $383,212 
Sample Size 172 157 310 176 308 198 
Notes: Zip codes restricted to those with 50+ MLS listings on Realtor.com and where the zip code could 
be merged to Census Factfinder data from 2000. Quartiles are within MSA. 
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Exhibit 5 
Regression Results on HHI (Unit of observation is Zip Code) 
  A B C D E F 
2nd Income Quartile  85.5 
(32.3) 
  -30.9 
(37.1) 
-30.2 
(36.2) 
-44 
(36.2) 
3rd Income Quartile  151.6 
(32.3) 
  -29.8 
(42.8) 
-29.6 
(41.8) 
-45.9 
(41.9) 
4th Income Quartile  353.9 
(32.3) 
  57.6 
(49.9) 
13.6 
(49.1) 
-19.6 
(49.4) 
 
2nd House Price Quartile 
 
  31.6 
(32.5) 
 -19.6 
(35.8) 
-39.9 
(35) 
-49.9 
(34.8) 
3rd House Price Quartile   128.8 
(32.5) 
 3.6 
(40) 
-32.5 
(39.4) 
-46.4 
(39.1) 
4th House Price Quartile   311.2 
(32.5) 
 137.3 
(45.9) 
15 
(47.2) 
-8 
(47.5) 
 
2nd Race Quartile    221.3 
(31.6) 
208.4 
(34.1) 
205.4 
(33.3) 
199.7 
(33) 
3rd Race Quartile    343.2 
(31.5) 
302.8 
(36) 
301.1 
(35.1) 
293.6 
(34.8) 
4th Race Quartile    414.5 
(31.6) 
368.7 
(35.7) 
327.3 
(35.3) 
318.8 
(35) 
 
Boston  314.8 
(45.8) 
314.6 
(46.2) 
315.4 
(44.8) 
315.5 
(43.8) 
231.9 
(44.4) 
167.4 
(46.6) 
Chicago  327.3 
(39.5) 
327.2 
(39.8) 
327.3 
(38.6) 
327.6 
(37.8) 
307.1 
(37) 
279.4 
(37.7) 
Dallas  238.1 
(44.5) 
238.1 
(44.8) 
238.1 
(43.5) 
238.1 
(42.6) 
224.9 
(41.6) 
206 
(41.8) 
Los Angeles  -181.8 
(39.5) 
-181.8 
(39.8) 
-181.8 
(38.6) 
-181.8 
(37.8) 
-313.3 
(40.6) 
-397.2 
(44.7) 
Washington DC  291.7 
(43.3) 
291.7 
(43.6) 
291.8 
(42.3) 
292 
(41.4) 
213.5 
(42.1) 
144.9 
(44.4) 
SD of List Price 
(/1000) 
     -0.1033 
(0.0380) 
 
Mean List Price 
(/1000) 
     0.3825 
(0.0621) 
 
90/10 Ratio of List Price       -10.3 
(4.2) 
Median List Price 
(/1000) 
      0.5556 
(0.0583) 
Constant Term  676.5 
(37.3) 
706.3 
(37.6) 
579.5 
(36.5) 
574.7 
(38.6) 
578.9 
(37.6) 
649.2 
(47.5) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Zip codes restricted to those with 50+ MLS listings on Realtor.com and 
where the zip code could be merged to Census Factfinder data from 2000. Quartiles are within MSA. Sample size is 
1321 zip codes in each regression. 
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Exhibit 6a – Market Leaders By MSA – Lowest Quartile vs. Highest Quartile – Atlanta MSA 
Lowest Income Quartile Highest Income Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 14.9% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 16.8% 
RE/MAX International 10.3% RE/MAX International 11.3% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 5.7% Harry Norman Realtors at CCOS 8.9% 
Better Homes & Gardens Metro 5.3% Coldwell Banker RE Corp. 8.7% 
Solid Source Realty GA LLC 4.2% Prudential Real Estate 7.5% 
Prudential Real Estate 3.0% Solid Source Realty GA LLC 3.1% 
Harry Norman Realtors at CCOS 2.3% Better Homes & Gardens Metro 2.7% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 1.8% Duffy Realty 2.5% 
Lowest House-Price Quartile Highest House-Price Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 13.6% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 17.1% 
RE/MAX International 11.6% RE/MAX International 10.8% 
Better Homes & Gardens Metro 5.7% Harry Norman Realtors at CCOS 10.0% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 4.7% Coldwell Banker RE Corp. 9.4% 
Solid Source Realty GA LLC 4.2% Prudential Real Estate 7.2% 
Prudential Real Estate 2.8% Solid Source Realty GA LLC 3.1% 
Harry Norman Realtors at CCOS 1.9% Duffy Realty 2.5% 
Southern REO Associates LLC 1.7% Sotheby’s International Realty 2.5% 
Lowest Race (%White) Quartile Highest Race (%White) Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 15.2% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 15.0% 
RE/MAX International 8.4% RE/MAX International 12.6% 
Solid Source Realty GA LLC 6.3% Prudential Real Estate 7.2% 
Better Homes & Gardens Metro 6.3% Coldwell Banker RE Corp. 6.1% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 4.7% Harry Norman Realtors at CCOS 5.6% 
Prudential Real Estate 2.9% Better Homes & Gardens Metro 3.7% 
Harry Norman Realtors at CCOS 2.4% Solid Source Realty GA LLC 3.3% 
Southern REO Associates LLC 1.8% Duffy Realty 2.0% 
Notes: Sample sizes are the same as for the MSA sample in Exhibit 1. 
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Exhibit 6b – Market Leaders By MSA – Lowest Quartile vs. Highest Quartile – Boston MSA 
Lowest Income Quartile Highest Income Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
RE/MAX International 10.7% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 23.8% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 9.3% RE/MAX International 7.8% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 7.4% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 5.8% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.4% Prudential Real Estate 5.8% 
Prudential Real Estate 3.4% Hammond Residential Real Estate 5.2% 
Sotheby’s International Realty 2.2% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 3.7% 
BHG Masiello 1.7% William Raveis RE & Home Services 3.6% 
William Raveis RE & Home Services 1.7% Sotheby’s International Realty 3.3% 
Lowest House-Price Quartile Highest House-Price Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
RE/MAX International 13.8% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 25.2% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 7.0% RE/MAX International 7.0% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 6.9% Hammond Residential Real Estate 6.3% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 6.8% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 5.3% 
Prudential Real Estate 6.7% Sotheby’s International Realty 4.6% 
Coco, Early & Associates 
The Olivares and Molina D’s 4.0% Prudential Real Estate 4.3% 
BHG Masiello 3.1% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 4.3% 
Bean Group 1.5% William Raveis RE & Home Services 3.5% 
Lowest Race (%White) Quartile Highest Race (%White) Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 15.5% RE/MAX International 10.7% 
RE/MAX International 7.2% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 7.4% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 7.1% Prudential Real Estate 6.3% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 5.2% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.2% 
Hammond Residential Real Estate 4.4% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 4.4% 
Sotheby’s International Realty Affiliates Inc. 3.6% 
Coco, Early & Associates 
The Olivares and Molina D’s 3.8% 
Prudential Real Estate 2.6% BHG Masiello 3.5% 
William Raveis Real Estate & Home Services 1.7% The Gove Group Real Estate LLC 2.4% 
Notes: Sample sizes are the same as for the MSA sample in Exhibit 1. 
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Exhibit 6c – Market Leaders By MSA – Lowest Quartile vs. Highest Quartile – Chicago MSA 
Lowest Income Quartile Highest Income Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
RE/MAX International 12.7% RE/MAX International 18.8% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 9.7% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 17.1% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 7.9% Baird & Warner 7.5% 
@PROPERTIES 5.0% Prudential Real Estate 6.9% 
Prudential Real Estate 3.5% Koenig & Strey GMAC Real Estate 5.1% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 3.2% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 4.7% 
Baird & Warner 2.8% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 3.8% 
McColly Real Estate Corporate 2.1% @PROPERTIES 3.4% 
Lowest House-Price Quartile Highest House-Price Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
RE/MAX International 15.6% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 16.5% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 9.7% RE/MAX International 14.8% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 9.4% Baird & Warner 7.5% 
McColly Real Estate Corporate 3.7% Prudential Real Estate 7.4% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 2.6% Koenig & Strey GMAC Real Estate 5.9% 
Prudential Real Estate 2.4% @PROPERTIES 5.8% 
Baird & Warner 2.0% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 4.8% 
Realty Executives International 1.6% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 3.8% 
Lowest Race (%White) Quartile Highest Race (%White) Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
RE/MAX International 12.2% RE/MAX International 19.0% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 11.1% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 15.1% 
@PROPERTIES 6.1% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 12.3% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 6.0% Prudential Real Estate 4.4% 
Prudential Real Estate 4.1% McColly Real Estate Corporate 4.3% 
Baird & Warner 4.0% Baird & Warner 3.3% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 3.7% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 3.3% 
Koenig & Strey GMAC Real Estate 2.4% Realty Executives International 2.4% 
Notes: Sample sizes are the same as for the MSA sample in Exhibit 1. 
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Exhibit 6d – Market Leaders By MSA – Lowest Quartile vs. Highest Quartile – Dallas MSA 
Lowest Income Quartile Highest Income Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 11.5% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 20.3% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 10.0% RE/MAX International 13.7% 
RE/MAX International 9.0% Ebby Halliday Realtors 12.3% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 6.8% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 8.8% 
Ebby Halliday Realtors 5.1% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 3.3% 
Williams Trew Real Estate Services 3.2% Prudential Real Estate 2.2% 
Virginia Cook Realtors 2.4% Allie Beth Allman & Assoc. 2.1% 
Allie Beth Allman & Assoc. 2.4% Virginia Cook Realtors 1.9% 
Lowest House-Price Quartile Highest House-Price Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 14.3% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 18.1% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 11.5% RE/MAX International 12.2% 
RE/MAX International 10.5% Ebby Halliday Realtors 12.0% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 8.5% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 8.2% 
Ebby Halliday Realtors 3.5% Allie Beth Allman & Assoc. 3.8% 
Johnson Monroe Realtors 1.7% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 3.2% 
Prudential Real Estate 1.6% Dave Perry Miller & Associates 2.7% 
Williams Trew Real Estate Services 1.4% Virginia Cook Realtors 2.5% 
Lowest Race (%White) Quartile Highest Race (%White) Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 12.0% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 16.9% 
RE/MAX International 10.6% RE/MAX International 11.1% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 8.9% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 9.4% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 7.1% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 7.8% 
Ebby Halliday Realtors 6.6% Ebby Halliday Realtors 6.9% 
Allie Beth Allman & Assoc. 2.8% Prudential Real Estate 2.4% 
Dave Perry Miller & Associates 2.6% Allie Beth Allman & Assoc. 1.7% 
Briggs Freeman Real Estate 2.1% HomesUSA 1.5% 
Notes: Sample sizes are the same as for the MSA sample in Exhibit 1. 
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Exhibit 6e – Market Leaders By MSA – Lowest Quartile vs. Highest Quartile – Los Angeles MSA 
Lowest Income Quartile Highest Income Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 10.3% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 12.3% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.8% Prudential Real Estate 9.8% 
RE/MAX International 6.0% RE/MAX International 8.1% 
Prudential Real Estate 5.9% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 5.8% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 5.1% First Team Real Estate 5.7% 
Pinacle Estate Properties Inc. 1.5% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 3.9% 
First Team Real Estate 1.1% Sotheby’s International Realty Affiliates Inc. 2.4% 
Rodeo Realty Inc. 0.9% Realty Executives International 1.6% 
Lowest House-Price Quartile Highest House-Price Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 11.8% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 15.2% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.8% Prudential Real Estate 10.3% 
RE/MAX International 6.3% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 7.0% 
Prudential Real Estate 5.7% RE/MAX International 6.4% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 5.0% First Team Real Estate 4.3% 
Pinacle Estate Properties Inc. 1.5% Sotheby’s International Realty Affiliates Inc. 3.6% 
Realty Executives International 1.2% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 2.7% 
First Team Real Estate 1.1% Rodeo Realty Inc. 2.3% 
Lowest Race (%White) Quartile Highest Race (%White) Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 12.0% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 12.4% 
RE/MAX International 6.7% Prudential Real Estate 10.6% 
Prudential Real Estate 5.7% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.9% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 5.2% RE/MAX International 6.6% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 4.9% First Team Real Estate 5.1% 
First Team Real Estate 1.5% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 3.7% 
Realty Executives International 0.9% Sotheby’s International Realty Affiliates Inc. 2.7% 
ERA 0.8% Rodeo Realty Inc. 2.5% 
Notes: Sample sizes are the same as for the MSA sample in Exhibit 1. 
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Exhibit 6f – Market Leaders By MSA – Lowest Quartile vs. Highest Quartile – Washington DC MSA 
Lowest Income Quartile Highest Income Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Long & Foster Real Estate Inc. 14.3% Long & Foster Real Estate Inc. 24.4% 
RE/MAX International 13.7% RE/MAX International 14.6% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.5% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.7% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 5.5% Weichert Real Estate Affiliates Inc. 6.6% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 4.6% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 4.8% 
Weichert Real Estate Affiliates Inc. 3.7% Washington Fine Properties LLC 3.5% 
Fairfax Realty Inc. 3.7% McEnearney Associates Inc. 3.0% 
Exit Realty Corp. International 2.7% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 2.3% 
Lowest House-Price Quartile Highest House-Price Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
RE/MAX International 14.6% Long & Foster Real Estate Inc. 25.1% 
Long & Foster Real Estate Inc. 12.8% RE/MAX International 12.7% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 7.1% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.2% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 6.4% Weichert Real Estate Affiliates Inc. 6.2% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 4.7% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 5.7% 
Weichert Real Estate Affiliates Inc. 3.6% Washington Fine Properties LLC 4.1% 
Fairfax Realty Inc. 3.5% McEnearney Associates Inc. 3.6% 
Exit Realty Corp. International 2.7% Sotheby’s International Realty Affiliates Inc. 3.1% 
Lowest Race (%White) Quartile Highest Race (%White) Quartile 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Firm 
Name 
Market 
Share 
Long & Foster Real Estate Inc. 16.6% RE/MAX International 18.8% 
RE/MAX International 13.2% Long & Foster Real Estate Inc. 15.8% 
Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.4% Keller-Williams Realty Inc. 6.2% 
Fairfax Realty Inc. 5.0% Weichert Real Estate Affiliates Inc. 6.0% 
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 4.1% Century 21 Real Estate LLC 5.7% 
Exit Realty Corp. International 4.0% Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. 4.2% 
Weichert Real Estate Affiliates Inc. 3.6% ERA 1.9% 
Century 21 Real Estate LLC 3.6% Real Estate Teams LLC 1.6% 
Notes: Sample sizes are the same as for the MSA sample in Exhibit 1. 
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Appendix I: Do the NAR data provide a complete picture of the housing market? 
 One important concern is the extent to which scraping data from www.Realtor.com provides a 
full characterization of local housing market conditions. The two key concerns are that For Sale By 
Owner (FSBO) listings could serve as an important and cheaper alternative to listing with a broker and 
that some brokers may put their listings on a local MLS but not on the NAR’s website. 
 We are aware of three recent studies that have analyzed FSBO activity. First, the National 
Association of Realtors (2011) has found that FSBO activity ranged from 9-14 percent over the past 
decade, with a dramatic reduction in FSBO activity during the latter half of the decade. For example, 
they report that FSBO activity in 2011 – the period when our sample was collected – was 10 percent. 
Their study also shows that in 37 percent of these FSBO transactions, the seller knew the buyer (NAR, 
2011, Exhibit 6-26). Second, Woodward (2008, p. 107) analyzed HUD-1 statements from 2001 and found 
a higher percentage of homes sold by FSBO than did the NAR study, even for the same time period. 18.5 
percent of the home transactions in her sample had no line items related to brokerage commissions, 
and it is unlikely that these brokerage fees would have been hidden in another line item.29 She notes 
that this percentage compares with a rate of 13 percent for 2001 from the NAR, and attributes the 
difference to the composition of the sample. She uses FHA data that focus on less-valuable homes which 
are more likely to be sold by their owners without assistance from a real estate agent. The data used in 
her analysis drew approximately equal numbers of loans from each state, and the 18.5 percent figure is 
not weighted for differences in the underlying availability of homes in each state. Thus it is difficult to 
compare her figure with the NAR’s. Finally, Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magné (2009) examine FSBO 
activity in Madison, Wisconsin. They find that the share of listings that are FSBO is roughly 21 percent. 
 Overall, none of these studies sheds much light on our sample. First, the overall FSBO 
percentages from the NAR are much higher in the earlier part of the decade, when the housing market 
was healthier. They are also national numbers and include both FSBO sales that are between related 
parties and those between unrelated parties. Since virtually all MLS transactions will be between 
unrelated parties, the NAR statistics will overstate the importance of FSBO activity on arm’s length 
transactions. Second, the fact that Woodward’s (2008) analysis also focuses on the early part of the 
decade and on a narrow segment of transactions (FHA loans, rather than conventional or jumbo loans) 
also calls into question the ability to extrapolate the findings to our sample. Finally, in a longer working 
paper that preceded the publication of Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magné (2009), the authors clearly 
acknowledge that their data come from a single city, and they do not know how representative their 
results are of other markets. They note that Madison, WI is unique in a number of respects (being a 
college town and a state capital), and that it is a mid-sized city, which is clearly different from the six 
large cities in our study. 
To further analyze the importance of FSBOs, we have investigated the-for-sale-by-owner market 
extensively to see what percentage of residential real estate transactions do not involve a real estate 
professional and thus fall outside the coverage of our Realtor.com data. We discuss the steps 
                                                          
29 Email correspondence with Dr. Woodward, August 29, 2012. 
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extensively below, and conclude that, at most, FSBO transactions account for slightly more than 10 
percent of housing transactions. 
First, it should be noted that NAR (2011) finds that only 10 percent of transactions were FSBO in 
2011, but many of those were where the seller knew the buyer prior to purchase. Even so, national 
statistics could mask substantial variation across cities or across neighborhoods. Conceptually, it is much 
more difficult to collect FSBO data than NAR data. FSBO sales are far more likely to be between parties 
that know each other, and therefore less likely to show up in the public domain until the transaction is 
completed. Even for FSBO’s that are arm’s length transactions, the intensity of marketing varies. The 
NAR (2011, Exhibits 7-8 and 8-11) reports that 38 percent of FSBO’s did not actively market their home 
at all, and only 33 percent of FSBO’s put the listing on the internet (versus 92 percent of agent listings). 
Thus, many FSBO listings may not represent serious selling efforts. 
Unlike Realtor.com, there is not a sole aggregator of FSBO listings (although some – like 
www.FSBOMadison.com – do an excellent job for a local market). Because it is impossible to account for 
the number of FSBO yard signs in a given market or neighborhood, our analysis requires that a FSBO 
seller has taken the larger step of listing their home online. We rely on two well known websites – 
www.Zillow.com and www.ForSaleByOwner.com . According to Zillow’s website, their real estate 
network (partnering with Yahoo) is the largest, with more than 25 million unique visitors each month. 
The ForSaleByOwner.com website advertises aggressively on Google, and currently ranks first in organic 
search for the term “FSBO”.30 At the time we accessed the Zillow data, the cost for a person to put their 
home on the FSBO listing was $1, and is currently free. Assuming a FSBO owner was aware of Zillow’s 
price, it seems likely they would list their home there, in addition to any other methods they were using 
to market their home. The cost to list on ForSaleByOwner.com is much higher, while at the same time 
offering better targeting to buyers who are open to FSBOs. As of August, 2012, the price to list on this 
website is $80.95 per month, or a one-time fee of $184 until sold, or a higher price for upgraded 
packages that include videos and wider reach.31 
In March 2012, we compared the number of listings on Realtor.com to each of these websites 
for the six large cities in our sample. The results are shown in Appendix Exhibit 2. The first five columns 
of data come from Zillow, the sixth column from Realtor.com, and the final column from 
ForSaleByOwner.com. Of the three websites, Zillow in some sense provides the fullest characterization 
of the housing market because it provides by city or zip code the number of agent listings, FSBO listings, 
and so forth. As the fifth column shows, the fraction of FSBO listings on Zillow is miniscule – under 2 
percent in all cities. Although the count is usually higher with the alternative website 
ForSaleByOwner.com, the fraction of listings that are FSBO is perhaps 5 percent for a city as a whole. 
Although the absolute level of FSBO activity is low for all six cities, it could be the case that such 
activity varies within city, which in turn could have a meaningful effect on our HHI measures. Thus, we 
examined the Zillow data by zip code, which directly addresses the concern that FSBO listings might vary 
from one neighborhood to another in a way that affects the HHI computations. We collected data for 
                                                          
30 As of August 30, 2012. 
31 See http://www.forsalebyowner.com/listing/new/package . 
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723 zip codes in the 6 cities; of these, 203 zip codes had at least 50 observations on agent listings and/or 
FSBO listings. One such illustration is provided in Appendix Figure 1, which is a screenshot from the zip 
code 60614 in Chicago, IL. There were 785 For Sale by Agent listings and 7 FSBO listings in that zip code. 
For each of these 203 zip codes, we computed the percentage of listings that were FSBO listings (e.g, 
𝐹𝑆𝐵𝑂(𝐹𝑆𝐵𝑂+𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑇) ). On average, the fraction of listings that were FSBO was 1.25 percent. 99 percent of the 
zip codes had fewer than 4.3 percent of listings as FSBO. As a consequence, it appears that FSBOs play a 
fairly minor role in the housing market, and the incidence of FSBO listings does not vary tremendously 
across neighborhoods (at least in the large cities and time period we examine). 
Finally, it is also a challenging task to compare Realtor.com data to local MLS data, since many 
local MLS’s require membership to gain access. We were able to examine, however, the count of listings 
for some large zip codes in Dallas on Realtor.com and the MLS site TexasRealEstate.com. We found a 
tight correspondence between the listings on the two sites for nine large zip codes (correlation=0.88). 
 In summary, this analysis suggests that our approach of using data from Realtor.com is the best 
and most comprehensive approach to measuring market activity, and captures the overwhelming share 
of all listing activity in the market. Both the use of FSBOs and ignoring the NAR site are relatively small 
issues, and don’t appear to vary dramatically by neighborhood. 
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Appendix Exhibit 1 – Data Extraction 
 
Atlanta- 
Sandy Springs- 
Marietta, 
GA 
Boston- 
Cambridge- 
Quincy, 
MA-NH 
Chicago- 
Naperville- 
Joliet, 
IL-IN-WI 
Dallas- 
Fort Worth- 
Arlington, 
TX 
Los Angeles- 
Long Beach- 
Santa Ana, 
CA 
Washington- 
Arlington- 
Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-
WV Total 
Initial Zip 
Codes Scraped 345 327 510 436 662 704 2984 
        
Zip codes with 
at least 1 
listing 254 234 419 279 375 323 1884 
        
> Dwellings in 
these zip 
codes 
(including 
duplicates) 86663 20267 86461 34933 52619 33289 314232 
        
> Listings per 
Zip Code 
(including 
duplicates) 341 87 206 125 140 103 
 
        
> Dwellings in 
these zip 
codes (no 
duplicates) 67426 19783 85825 34782 52037 32986 292839 
        
% 
Unduplicated 78% 98% 99% 100% 99% 99% 93% 
        
> Listings per 
Zip Code (no 
duplicates) 265 85 205 125 139 102 155 
        Zip codes 
within MSA 254 234 419 279 375 323 1884 
        
Zip codes 
within official 
city according 
to USPS 50 26 62 46 63 25 272 
        
Zip codes with 
agent-
reported city 
name 71 27 61 50 87 22 318 
        Zip codes 
within MSA 254 234 419 279 375 323 1884 
        
Zip codes 
within MSA 
(50 or more 
listings) 177 158 327 185 314 200 1361 
        
Zip codes 
within MSA 172 157 310 176 308 198 1321 
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(50 or more 
listings, 
merged to 
Census 
Factfinder) 
        > Firms in MSA 
(Unedited) 2465 2180 3529 2166 6736 1749 18825 
        
> Firms in 
MSA (Minor 
Edits) 2028 1767 3179 1935 5855 1500 16264 
        
> Firms in 
MSA (Major 
Edits) 1775 1618 2964 1856 5296 1413 14922 
Notes: Source of USPS cities is http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/citytown.jsp . “Minor Edits” include: Changing lower case to upper case; removing 
extra spaces, dashes, periods, commas, slashes, explanation points, or ampersands; Converting RE MAX to REMAX, AND to &, C 21 to CENTURY 
21, etc.; and treating each office as its own brokerage. “Major Edits” include grouping all franchisees as one firm. 
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Appendix Exhibit 2 
Homes For Sale, By Type 
City By 
Agent 
By 
Owner 
New 
Homes 
Foreclosures 𝐹𝑆𝐵𝑂(𝐹𝑆𝐵𝑂 + 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑇) Realtor com For Sale 
By 
Owner 
.com 
Atlanta, GA 4632 80 24 823 1.70% 8757 209 
Boston, MA 2106 27 2 311 1.27% 1577 66 
Chicago, IL 13000 166 0 11,000 1.26% 16119 491 
Dallas, TX 5559 73 57 417 1.30% 4622 162 
Los Angeles, CA 10000 89 38 6746 0.88% 5286 37 
Washington, DC 2270 32 14 297 1.39% 2149 140 
Source: Zillow.com, Realtor.com and ForSaleByOwner.com, accessed 3/13/2012 
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Appendix Figure 1 
Zillow Screenshot from Chicago, IL 
 
 
 
Notes: Screenshot taken from www.zillow.com in March, 2012. 
 
